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Should a Historically Motivated Anti-Realist be a Stanfordite?

Abstract: Suppose one believes that the historical record of discarded scientific theories provides good evidence against scientific realism.  Should one adopt Kyle Stanford’s specific critique of realism?  I present reasons for answering this question in the negative.  In particular, Stanford’s challenge, based on the problem of unconceived alternatives, cannot use many of the prima facie strongest pieces of historical evidence against realism: (i) superseded theories whose successors were explicitly conceived, and (ii) superseded theories that were not the result of elimination-of-alternatives inferences.

1. Introduction.
 Scientific realism’s opponents have long appealed to the history of science as evidence for their position.  The most important recent development in this tradition is probably Kyle Stanford’s Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (PUA), which supposedly explains his New Induction (NI) over the history of science.  According to the PUA, “our cognitive constitutions or faculties are not well-suited to exhausting the kinds of spaces of serious alternative theoretical possibilities from which our fundamental theories of nature are drawn” (2006, 45).  In other words, in ‘fundamental’ scientific theorizing, scientists lack the cognitive ability to devise all plausible hypotheses that would explain the evidence available to them.  The NI states that historical scientists often failed to exhaust the space of scientifically respectable hypotheses that would explain the evidence available to them at that historical time; therefore, present scientists are probably failing similarly.  For example, General Relativity can explain all the data that was available to Newton, but Einstein’s theory was not conceived until the early 20th Century.  Stanford claims this creates a problem for realism, because many scientific theories are inferred via an elimination-of-alternatives inference (also known as ‘disjunctive syllogism’) (2006, 28).  In an eliminative inference, a supposedly exhaustive list of hypotheses (H1  H2  …  Hn) is proposed, and all are eliminated (H2, … Hn) except one (H1); we conclude the single remaining hypothesis is correct.  But the NI gives us reason to believe that, for ‘fundamental’ domains of scientific theorizing, the list of hypotheses probably does not contain a true hypothesis, so the disjunction is probably untrue. Therefore, in those fundamental domains such an argument would be unsound, and thus we lack sufficient evidence to believe scientific theory H1 is true.  Call this the PUA-based argument against realism.
Many critics of Stanford’s position reject anti-realism.  This paper takes a different perspective: suppose one is moved by the ‘dustbin of history,’ and wishes to be a historically motivated anti-realist.  Should one accept Stanford’s particular version of this view?  I present evidence for a negative answer: the PUA-based argument against realism omits much of the best historical evidence against scientific realism, and as a result, delivers an unnecessarily restricted version of anti-realism.  In particular, many discarded theories that are prima facie strong evidence against realism involve either conceived alternatives or non-eliminative (‘projective’) inferences.  Section 2 describes historical examples of such conceived alternatives, and section 3 lists theories that were inferred projectively, but were later discarded.   Along the way, I argue that the most natural attempts to accommodate these cases within the PUA either fail on their own terms or contravene Stanford’s other commitments.
Now, Stanford might reply that he can accept my claims in §§2-3 without contradiction.  I accept that the NI and PUA, considered in isolation, are consistent with the points in §§2-3.  However, Section 4 argues that some of Stanford’s other central claims are in tension with those points.  In particular, if a Stanfordite accepts the main contentions of §§2-3, then she must reject Stanford’s claims about the importance of the PUA, and relinquish the existence of an epistemic distinction between projective inferences and eliminative ones—a distinction Stanford needs for his instrumentalism to be piecemeal or selective instead of global. 

2. Conceived Alternatives
I grant that the NI provides evidence against realism.  However, if a historically motivated anti-realist restricts her evidence to cases where the alternatives to the prevailing theory were unconceived, then she omits some of the prima facie best historical evidence for anti-realism.  Much of the most compelling evidence for historically based anti-realism involves cases where the successor theory was conceived explicitly—and explicitly rejected at that earlier time as inferior to the now-discarded theory.  

2.1.  Examples  
One set of interrelated examples appears in Book I of Ptolemy’s Almagest.  In I.5, Ptolemy argues that the Earth must be at the center of the universe, by assuming for reductio that it is not, and deducing claims that contradict accepted observations (specifically, an observer anywhere on the Earth always sees half of the zodiac).  In I.7, he considers the hypothesis that the Earth is moving from one place to another, and argues that it is impossible, given the arguments in I.5 (for if it were moving from one place to another, it could not be at the center all the time).  The absence of stellar parallax is further evidence that the earth does not move from one place to another.  Later in I.7, Ptolemy considers the hypothesis that the Earth rotates on its axis.  He admits that this hypothesis is consistent with the celestial phenomena, but argues that no version of this hypothesis is consistent with terrestrial phenomena.
These three hypotheses—that the Earth has a translational motion, rotates daily, and is not at the center of the universe—were explicitly conceived by Ptolemy.  He rejected each of them because he thought the balance of the evidence told against them.  This shows that even when scientists evaluate a hypothesis that later scientists will come to believe superior, the earlier scientists can reject it.  The NI cannot appeal to such cases as evidence against realism, since they involve conceived alternatives that are later accepted.
These hypotheses are not isolated instances.  The hypothesis that the heat of a body consists in the motion of that body’s parts was in the same situation from the early-to-mid 1700’s until about 1840.​[1]​  The view that heat was the motion of component corpuscles was defended by several luminaries of the Scientific Revolution.  However, as the 1700’s progressed, this hypothesis came to be regarded as inferior to the view that heat was material by many of the leading researchers at the time.​[2]​  These material caloric theorists had certainly considered the view that heat was motion of the constituent particles, since they had read the mechanical philosophers, but they rejected it.  Enlightenment caloric theorists brought several arguments against the mechanical view of their predecessors (Brush 1976, 28-30); perhaps most compelling was the fact that heat can diffuse across a vacuum, but the motion of particles cannot be transmitted across a space that contains no particles.
There are further examples, such as the mutability of species.  Linnaeus, for example, concisely argues that “no new species are produced” (1964 [1735], 18), arguing against the successor hypothesis that new species are created.  Several other candidates for further examples are considered in (Hook 2002), a collection on Gunther Stent’s notion of a ‘premature’ hypothesis; (Barber 1961) contains a classic list of hypotheses that were considered, rejected, and later accepted.  In sum: restricting focus to the problem of unconceived alternatives shrinks the body of evidence available in support of historically-motivated anti-realism—for each of these cases involves conceived alternatives to the then-dominant theory. 

2.2. Objection: These successor theories are unconceived, and thus are examples of the PUA 
A Stanfordite might claim that these historical episodes do instantiate the PUA.  I can imagine two possible grounds for this: (a) at the earlier time, the eventual successor theories were not conceived in full detail.  (b) The above presentation treats theories too atomistically; if instead the unit of analysis was the whole set of related hypotheses brought to bear on the phenomena, then these cases instantiate the PUA, since the whole set of successor theories was not conceived at the earlier time.  
A Stanfordite who urges (a) points out that e.g. Ptolemy does not consider Newton’s specific model of the Universe in all its detail, and therefore concludes that Ptolemy’s case is part of the inductive base for the NI.  A similar objection could be leveled at material caloric theorists’ explicit consideration of the view that heat is motion: the scientific revolutionaries’ view is less specific than the theory that would later supplant the material caloric theory, viz. the kinetic theory.  Thus, the successor theory had not been truly conceived (since the predecessor lacked the successor’s full detail), and therefore this case is also part of the NI’s inductive base.  
First, I agree that these conceived,-rejected,-then-accepted theories were often not originally conceived in the complete detail of the actual successor.  However, this is not evidence that the NI can use these cases as part of its inductive base.  For a realist about the successor theory would say that the previously rejected theory (e.g. ‘The Earth rotates diurnally’) was nonetheless true—even if the earlier version is not maximally specific.  Therefore, Stanford’s PUA-based argument against realism would founder, since the list of alternative hypotheses considered at the earlier time does contain a true (though not maximally detailed) hypothesis.  Furthermore, for certain examples, this lack-of-specificity objection rests on a factual error.  For example, Daniel Bernoulli had proposed a theory similar to the modern kinetic theory of gases in 1738 (Brush 1976, 20), a century before the kinetic theory was widely accepted.
A Stanfordite who instead appeals to (b) could stress that some of Ptolemy’s arguments against the Earth’s diurnal rotation use (parts of) Aristotelian physics for premises.  Thus, the appropriate ‘alternative’ hypothesis here is not the bare claim that the Earth rotates (which she grants was conceived), but rather the conjunction of this claim and the relevant parts of Newtonian or general relativistic dynamics.  And those larger conjunctions were unconceived by Ptolemy, so this more holistically-conceived theory would be part of the inductive base for the NI.  
This deserves two replies.  First, although Ptolemy’s arguments against the Earth’s diurnal rotation appeal to Aristotelian physics, his other arguments do not.  For example, the arguments from lack of stellar parallax and the fact that every observer sees half the zodiac are independent of Aristotelian physics.  Second, more generally, this objection is in tension with Stanford’s professed aversion to confirmational holism. The ‘alternatives’ that were unconceived in this response are not individual hypotheses, but whole conglomerations of theories.  I will not weigh the pros and cons of confirmational holism here, but Stanford himself expresses anti-holist sentiments (2006, §2.2).
	 
3. The Problem of Unconceived Unrepresentativeness
This section argues that many famous examples of discarded historical hypotheses resulted from projective inferences, not eliminative ones.​[3]​  These projective inferences were often problematic because inquirers did not realize their samples were unrepresentative of the total population in relevant ways; some variable that was not previously recognized as relevant was in fact relevant.  To mimic Stanford’s terminology, we might call this the ‘Problem of Unconceived Relevant Variables,’ or the ‘Problem of Unconceived Unrepresentativeness.’  Stanford’s PUA-based argument against realism sidelines these cases, since they do not involve eliminative inferences—even though they are prima facie excellent evidence for a historically based case against realism. 

3.1. Examples
One example of such a case is the Galilean velocity-addition law, which was superseded by the Lorentz transformation at the beginning of the 20th Century.  
The Galilean velocity-addition law is:

(where v is the relative velocity between the observer and the moving object). The corresponding Lorentz Transformation is:

Length contraction can be derived from this.  The Galilean velocity-addition law (and its corollary, that the length of a rigid body is independent of its frame of reference) was presumably, for most scientists from the 17th to the end of the 19th century, seen as the conclusion of a projective argument (Newton says as much in the General Scholium, at least if being “rendered general by induction” is (a type of) projection).  So it is a discarded theory that is not the result of an eliminative inference, and thus one that a Stanfordite cannot appeal to as part of the inductive base for the NI. 
A second example is the classical hypothesis that the ‘fixed’ stars are eternal. This was widely held, presumably on projective grounds, until there was sufficient data to demonstrate that what we call ‘novas’ were not changes in the Earth’s upper atmosphere.  The discovery of superconductivity provides a third example of this type.  Before Heike Kamerlingh Onnes discovered Mercury’s superconducting state in 1911, scientists projectively inferred that a body’s heat capacity is proportional to its temperature, and its electrical resistivity is proportional to temperature cubed.  Onnes observed that below a certain critical temperature, both quantities quickly approached zero.
Another straightforward example is the projective inference that since classical mechanics worked at many scales, it works at all scales—an inference invalidated by quantum phenomena.  (This is not the claim that the laws of motion were themselves inferred projectively; rather, the claim is that the inference from ‘the laws of classical mechanics hold for middle-sized dry goods and the solar system’ to the conclusion ‘The laws of classical mechanics will also hold for smaller spatial scales’ is projective.)

3.2 Objection: These cases are evidence for the NI  
An objector might suggest that these are simply paradigm examples of the PUA in action: Enlightenment scientists didn’t conceive that the length of a moving body is inversely proportional to √(1 – v2/c2).  19th C scientists didn’t conceive that, for certain materials, there is some temperature below which that material’s heat capacity decreases very rapidly to zero, instead of linearly.  Of course, I grant that historical scientists did not conceive of these currently accepted hypotheses.  However, Stanford cannot hold that these cases are part of the NI’s inductive base without relinquishing some of his other commitments; in particular, he must either (a) claim that projective inferences are subject to the PUA, or (b) hold that these apparently projective inferences are actually eliminative inferences in disguise.  Stanford cannot accept either, without giving up other core claims.
	Suppose a Stanfordite accepts (a), allowing that these are projective inferences, but claiming that projective inferences can be part of the NI’s inductive base.  I will argue that Stanford cannot do this without frustrating his desire to draw a significant epistemic difference between projective and eliminative inferences (2010; 2011; 2006, 39).  For example, Stanford writes: “a consensus in favor of a given theoretical scientific belief should be regarded with considerably more suspicion when the evidence we have in support of that belief is exclusively or even just centrally abductive in character,” as opposed to projective (2010, 234). (Terminological note: ‘abductive evidence’ constitutes the premises of an eliminative inference.)  This is the core of what we could call Stanford’s ‘selective instrumentalism’: “the limited skepticism thus motivated [by the NI] should certainly not extend to every scientific claim or hypothesis and may even have different force as applied to the scientific exploration of different domains” (2006, 37; my emphasis).​[4]​  And Stanford uses this distinction when he justifies his belief that microscopic organisms exist​[5]​ by appealing to the fact that we have “evidence of a non-eliminative character” of their existence (2006, 35; see also 33). The fact that microscopic organisms are not eliminatively inferred would not be evidence for their existence, unless we should be realists about (empirically successful, widely adopted) theoretical claims that are projectively inferred.​[6]​  But if the PUA applies to projective inferences, then we should not be realists about the conclusions of projective arguments.  So Stanford can only follow (a) by giving up his ‘limited,’ selective, or “piecemeal” instrumentalism (2006, 48).  And if he does that, then his view collapses back into the classical PI (or something similar) (Magnus 2010, §3)—at least in terms of how much ‘suspicion’ we should cast over our current scientific theories.
Suppose a Stanfordite instead pursues (b), claiming that the above examples are actually eliminative inferences in disguise.  Then there are two possibilities: either all apparently projective inferences are actually eliminative inferences, or there is something special about these apparently projective inferences that makes them eliminative inferences in disguise.  If all apparently projective inferences are actually eliminative inferences, then again the distinction between projective and eliminative inference disappears, and with it Stanford’s piecemeal, limited skepticism.  So there must be something about these particular apparently projective inferences that make them eliminative.  However, this appears untenable for Stanford as well.  For he says that since one can “reframe” any projective inference as an eliminative one (2010, 234), the way to draw the line between projective and eliminative inference is by distinguishing those inferences that are “amenable to construal as a kind of inductive projection” from those that are not (2010, 235).  That is, Stanford thinks we should view inferences that cannot be couched as projective inferences with ‘considerably more suspicion’ than those that can.  This seems to rule out the ‘eliminative inference in disguise’ route for the Stanfordite, since all that is required for an inference to be projective in the sense Stanford considers epistemically important is that the inference can be framed as projective—and the above examples fit that bill. 

3.3. Objection: this is merely the general problem of induction, thus not a specific problem for scientific knowledge  
When discussing eliminative inference in scientific reasoning, Stanford brackets Cartesian skeptical hypotheses, even though many skeptical arguments are eliminative.  His reason for doing so is that Cartesian skepticism is a problem in general epistemology, whose purported provenance is not specifically about scientific theorizing.  But, he says, the arguments against scientific realism are supposed to pose a special problem for scientific knowledge, not for all knowledge (2006, 12-13).  So, perhaps a Stanfordite would level a parallel objection against the problem of unconceived unrepresentativeness: it is just the hoary philosophical problem of induction.  The problem of induction is an important problem in general epistemology, like Cartesian skepticism—but it is not a special problem for science, just as Cartesian skepticism is not a special problem for science.  But (to repeat) historically-motivated anti-realism is supposed to be a special problem for science.
	First reply: what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.  The PUA-based argument against realism may suffer from an exactly analogous problem, since disjunctive syllogism is ubiquitous: if Chrysippus is to be believed, even dogs use it.  This inference form is not restricted to scientific inquiries, and having doubts about the disjunction premise in a disjunctive syllogism is not restricted to scientific contexts, either.  
Second, whether the problem of induction is a special problem for science depends on the exact meaning of ‘the problem of induction.’  If the problem of induction is restricted to the question ‘Can we give a non-circular justification of our belief that the future will resemble the past?’, then it is not a special problem for science.  But the above cases of the Galilean transformation etc. do not merely extrapolate future events from past ones.  Rather, they instantiate a more abstract pattern of inductive generalization: given that a limited sample of a certain kind of entity is a certain way, infer that all such entities are that way.  These traits are not merely inferred to be uniform over time, but rather over a wide variety of other variables (including scale, velocity, or temperature).  And this is a paradigmatically scientific inference: inferring from our very limited observations in the lab or field that some pattern holds for any sample of DNA, or any energetically closed system, or any two massive bodies in the universe etc., is a stereotypically scientific inference.  (Of course, reasoning from a limited sample to a total population is of course not the exclusive province of science.  But again, neither is disjunctive syllogism.)  
Furthermore, and more importantly, the degree or scale of generalization in scientific contexts—at least for the kind of fundamental theories and mechanisms at issue in the realism debate—is typically much wider in scientific inferences than everyday inferences.  Howard Stein expresses this point clearly when describing his initial encounter with Newton’s argument for universal gravitation in the Principia: 
“The empirical evidence available to Newton all concerned what one can reasonably describe as, first, “ordinary” behavior of “ordinary” terrestrial bodies (which of course contains no sign whatever of any such universal mutual attraction), and second, crucially, the changes of position… of eleven bright objects in the sky, and the changes in visible shape and/or luminousness … of a few of these.  To say that these are, prima facie, scanty grounds for the astoundingly far-reaching conclusion Newton came to will surely be seen as no overstatement.” (2014(?!), 2; my emphasis) 
<<This is maybe not the best quotation, because this is stressing the scantiness of the evidence, not the breadth of the conclusion; maybe break this ‘commonsense vs scientific inductions’ point into (a) logically stronger conclusions (b) less evidence [given the logical strength of the conclusion] for the conclusion; Stein’s feeling is about (b).>>
 
The point is that our everyday inductive practices do not typically make conclusions about every massive body in the universe, the shape of every gene, or every species in the history of the planet.  Our workaday inductions are typically to much weaker conclusions.  [[There’s the old logical problem that EVERY generalization is about everything: All Fs are Gs = Everything is the universe is such that either it is F and G or it’s not F.  But]]
In sum, however we construe ‘The problem of induction,’ this objection fails.  If ‘the problem of induction’ only refers to the problem of justifying beliefs about the future on the basis of beliefs about the past, then the historical cases presented above are not part of the problem of induction that belongs to general epistemology.  However, if ‘the problem of induction’ refers to any inference from a limited sample to a total population, then such sample-based reasoning is central to much scientific inference—and the cases discussed in this section instantiate this type of reasoning. 

4. Can’t the Stanfordite accept the PI?
The previous two sections aimed to show that a proponent of the NI cannot appeal to many of the ‘Greatest Hits’ in the standard historically-motivated anti-realist’s catalogue, without giving up other central Stanfordite commitments.  A Stanfordite might respond that she can agree with everything in the previous two sections.  After all, Chapters 6 and 7 of (2006) defend (something like) the PI from realist criticisms.  And Stanford himself says: “I view the problem of unconceived alternatives not as competing with the traditional challenges of underdetermination and the pessimistic induction so much as bringing out what was most significant and compelling about those challenges to begin with” (2006, 45).  I agree that the PUA and the NI are consistent with the PI: historically based anti-realists can make new inductions, but keep the old.  However, I do not agree that the PUA captures ‘what was most significant about the PI to begin with.’ Furthermore, accepting the PI is inconsistent with Stanford’s piecemeal instrumentalism.
  
4.1.  Stanford over-values the PUA-based argument against realism
Stanford believes the PUA poses the most important problem for scientific realism.  He writes: “the problem of unconceived alternatives… lies at the heart of any serious objection to scientific realism” (200; my emphasis).  This is not an isolated moment of over-exuberance, since we find similar remarks elsewhere: “it is our vulnerability to the problem of unconceived alternatives … that is most significant to the debate over scientific realism” (23; my emphasis), and “the problem of unconceived alternatives poses the most serious challenge to believing the claims of contemporary scientific theories” (39; my emphasis).  In short, Stanford considers the PUA-based argument against realism the best argument against realism.
Let us consider Stanford’s claims in turn.  First, let us examine the assertion that the PUA ‘lies at the heart of any serious objection to scientific realism.’  If so, then if the PI is a serious objection to scientific realism, then the PUA is at the heart of the PI.  I do not know precisely what Stanford means by ‘X is at the heart of any Y,’ but presumably it entails ‘X is a necessary condition for Y.’  So, if the PUA disappeared, then there would be no serious objections to scientific realism—including the PI.  I think this is incorrect.  Sections 2-3 presented classes of historical cases that are evidence for the PI but not evidence for the NI.  This shows that there is some evidence against realism that is independent of the PUA.  So, one might infer directly that this evidence is suffices to demonstrate that the PUA is not necessary for ‘any serious objection to realism.’  However, a Stanfordite could conceivably reply that any historically based argument against realism that omitted every historical case that did not instantiate the PUA is not ‘serious’ (perhaps on the grounds that it would simply leave out too many important cases from the dustbin of history).  Now, I take no position on whether there are enough cases in the historical record that instantiate the problem of conceived alternatives, or the problem of unconceived unrepresentativeness, to pose a ‘serious’ challenge to realism—primarily because I do not wish to argue about what the threshold number for ‘serious’ is.
Nonetheless, this Stanfordite reply can still be answered.  To say that the PUA is a necessary condition for any serious objection to realism means that if the PUA disappeared, then all the serious objections to realism would also disappear.  So let us imagine that, for historical episodes that actually involved unconceived successor theories, all the later successor theories had instead been conceived at the earlier time.  For example, imagine that quantum mechanics had been explicitly formulated in 1750.  Now the question is: can a serious objection to realism be posed in this hypothetical alternative history?  And the answer appears to be yes: as Magnus (2006) and Saatsi (2009, 359) have pointed out, given the evidence available to scientists in 1750, Newtonian mechanics is better confirmed than general relativity and quantum mechanics.  (No independent evidence available in 1750 suggests that the laws of motion are drastically different at scales outside what was detectable in 1750.)  So scientists in 1750 (if they are rational) would have still accepted Newtonian mechanics, even if the PUA were removed.  If something similar holds for many other historical cases that actually involved unconceived successor theories, then the PUA is not necessary for a serious objection to realism (unless there is no serious, historically based objection to realism—a route obviously unavailable to the Stanfordite).
Let us now turn to Stanford’s claims that the PUA is the “most significant” or “most serious” challenge to realism.  I believe it may be irresoluble whether the PUA or the PI is more important, since there may be no standard of significance or seriousness to decide the question shared between the disputants.  But since Stanford makes this claim, I address it.  I see at least two reasons to resist it.  First, if an argument leaves out much of the prima facie evidence for a conclusion, and correspondingly settles for a more restricted conclusion (the moral of sections 2-3), then that argument is prima facie less important than a related argument that draws upon more of the relevant evidence, and accordingly establishes a wider conclusion.  Second, one could argue that ‘problem of conceived alternatives’ cases, like the geo-eccentric hypothesis, are a more serious problem for realism than cases that instantiate the PUA.  Why? Cases like the Earth’s diurnal rotation and Daniel Bernoulli’s kinetic theory of gases show that even when we explicitly consider the correct theory—i.e. the truth is ‘staring us in the face’—we can still reject it.  In my opinion, that makes us look even more epistemically inept than an inability to conceive of the true theory, when the true theory is conceptually distant from our current list of live options.  To be clear, I do not think these two reasons conclusively establish that the PI is definitely more significant than the PUA (whatever ‘significance’ comes to). However, they do present a challenge that a Stanfordite must answer, if she wishes to maintain that the PUA presents the most significant challenge to realism.

4.2. Accepting the PI is inconsistent with Stanford’s piecemeal instrumentalism  
The argument for the claim in above sub-heading is straightforward, since all the pieces were presented in 3.1 above.  Stanford wants his criticism of realism to be selective or piecemeal.  This is achieved by casting “considerably more suspicion” on widely accepted, empirically successful fundamental theories that are eliminatively inferred than those that are projectively inferred.  Yet §3 showed that many theories that are evidence for the PI’s inductive base were projectively inferred.  Thus, anyone who accepts the PI as a persuasive argument against realism cannot (in the absence of special pleading) simultaneously endorse Stanford’s brand of piecemeal skepticism about scientific theories.  

5. Conclusion
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^1	  The cut-off date of 1840 comes from (Brush 1976, 27), but the decline was gradual: (Metcalfe 1859) criticizes the hypothesis that heat is the motion of constituent parts.
^2	  Defenders of caloric sometimes admitted that the evidence did not demonstrate that heat was material.  Joseph Black is typical: “Such an idea [viz., material caloric] of the nature of heat is, therefore, the most probable of any I know; … It is, however, altogether a supposition” (Black 1803, 33).  However, Black also says that the mechanical theory is “totally inconsistent with the phenomena” (80).
^3	  The view that all inductive inference actually has the form of disjunctive syllogism has been defended (Montague 1906, 281).  One could argue that the inference from ‘All A’s observed thus far have been B’ to ‘All A’s are B’ in effect eliminates any more complex explanation of why the observed A’s have been B, without explicitly listing all these more complex alternatives.  Stanford himself mentions a similar possibility (2010, 234).
^4	  See (Magnus 2010) for discussion of Stanford’s piecemeal strategy.
^5	  This is important to Stanford, for it distinguishes his instrumentalism from Constructive Empiricism.
^6	  Stanford makes similar remarks about the ‘hypothesis of organic fossil origins’: “the vulnerability of the hypothesis of organic fossil origins to any serious version of the challenge posed by the PUA has been most dramatically reduced by the fact that we have managed to supplement the fundamentally abductive sorts of evidence long available in support of it with compelling further evidence that depends instead on a more straightforward sort of inductive projection” (2010, 221).
